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REcENT CASES
WormxN's COMPENSATION-HEART CASE AFER 1956 AmxNnmxF= RE-
QtnuNG TAuMmnMc PERsoN.L INJURY-Decedents wife appealed the
judgment of the circuit court which affirmed the dismissal by the
Workmen's Compensation Board of her claim for death benefits.
Decedent after operating an air hammer for two hours became ill. He
was rushed to a hospital where he died within forty minutes. The
attending physician certified that the immediate cause of death was
coronary thrombosis, or occlusion with coronary arteriosclerosis as a
secondary cause. Decedent had no known previous manifestation of
a coronary ailment, but medical testimony established the presence of
a pre-existing heart condition. Other testimony was related to the
decedents exertion: one doctor stated that the exertion could have
contributed to his death, and two others stated that it probably did.
Held: Reversed with directions to apportion the award between the
pre-existing disease and the injury. In so holding, the court considered
the development of trauma as a requirement for compensation in
Kentucky. Prior to 1955 the court proceeded on the assumption that
an injury, to be compensable, had to be traumatic. Adams v. Bryant,'
in 1955 established that an injury need not be traumatic to be com-
pensable. In 1956 the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act2 was
amended by insertion of the word traumatic preceding the words
personal injury.3 In a case arising before the effective date of the
amendment, but decided in 1960, Terry v. Associated Stone Co.,4 it was
held that physical exertion precipitating a coronary occlusion is a
personal injury by accident within the meaning of the statute. The
parties seem to agree that the purpose of the 1956 amendment was
to nullify the effect of the Adams case. But in view of the meaning
of that slippery word, traumatic, we are unable to determine the
legislative intent of the 1956 amendment. The intent was not that an
employee might suffer a work-connected accidental injury without
compensation. The Court was not persuaded that such an anomaly
was wittingly contemplated by the legislature, especially in view of
the clear injunction of the law that it be liberally construed. As the
testimony establishes a direct contribution between the work and the
heart attack, the injury is compensable. Grimes v. Goodlett & Adams,
345 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1961).
This comment purports to show that the court in the principal
case has, by evading the issue, consciously misapplied the statutory
law of this state. This misapplication resulted from the court's inter-
1 274 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1955).
2 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.005(1) (1956) [hereinafter referred to as KRS].
3 KRS 342.005(1).
4 884 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1960).
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pretation or its failure to interpret the phrase traumatic personal in-
jury. The original Workmen's Compensation Act, which was enacted
in 1916, did not contain the word traumatic as a modifier of the phrase
personal injuries.5 However, there has been a great deal of confusion
as to whether trauma was required. This comment will not attempt
to answer this question, as it is discussed in a previous note.6
The Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended in 1956, provided
that employers were liable only for traumatic personal injuries:
It shall affect the liability of the employers subject thereto to their
employes for a traumatic personal injury sustained by the employe
by accident, ... provided, however, that 'traumatic personal injury
by accident' as herein defined shall not include diseases except
where the disease is the natural and direct result of a traumatic in-
jury by accident nor shall it include the results of a pre-existing
disease .... 7 (Emphasis added.)
What was the purpose of the amendment? The court in the prin-
cipal case recognized that it was to nullify the effect of Adams v.
Bryant,8 which held that an injury did not have to be traumatic to be
compensable. The statute was amended in the next session of the
General Assembly following the Adams decision so logically it was
intended to offset Adams' potential effect. However, it appears that
the court in the principal case felt the established law was sufficient
and ignored the legislative effort.
Statutes must be interpreted by the courts, and the Workmen's
Compensation Act requires a liberal construction,9 but as stated in
Howard v. Dawkins:
5 Ky. Acts 1916, ch. 33, § 1:
It shall affect the liability of the employers subject thereto to their
employes for personal injuries sustained by the employe by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment or for death
resulting from such accidental injury: provided, however, that personal
injury by accident as herein defined shall not include diseases except
where the disease is the natural and direct result of a traumatic injury
by accident....
6 Note, 47 Ky. L.J. 437 (1959). The author of the note, in tracing the
definition of trauma in Kentucky prior to 1956, states that the definition was
established in Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 271, 46 S.W.2d
87, 89 (1932):
It will be noted that this does not include within its scope and
meaning only physical force in the sense of a blow, a current of elec-
tricity, or like terms implying power, vigor, violence, or energy in the
commonly accepted meaning of those terms, but may be as consistently
construed to include any independent influence or causes external to the
body coming into direct contact with, and causing injury to, the physical
structures thereof.
7 KS 342.005(1).
8 274 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1955).
9 KRS 342.004:
This chapter shall be liberally construed on questions of law, as dis-
tinguished from evidence, and the rule of law requiring strict con-
(Footnote continued on next page)
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[L]iberality of construction or interpretation-as well as administra-
tion-does not license the court or the administrative board to amend
or emasculate the statute so as to create liability thereunder when
it by its express terms, as construed and applied by the courts,
excludes the particular accident from the benefits conferred.1o
Kentucky cases have distinguished between internal injuries result-
ing from strain, which generally have been compensable,11 and heart
cases. "A disabling heart attack resulting from a pre-existing disease
but possibly superinduced by excitement or exertion has not been
recognized in this jurisdiction as compensable."' Because of this
distinction, and the absence of any indication in the amended statute
that a new definition of trauma was to be applied to any particular
injury, the court in the principal case should have been limited by the
definition of trauma which existed in heart cases prior to the Adams
case.13
The testimony in the principal case established that decedent had
a pre-existing heart condition, and that he suffered a heart attack after
exerting himself in the course of his employment. In 1922 the court
denied compensation, where decedent ascending a ladder in a moment
of excitement suffered a heart attack, because the death resulted from
a pre-existing heart condition and not a traumatic personal injury.14
In a case involving a more strenuous exertion, the court failed to find
what they considered the requisite trauma where an employee with no
knowledge of a previous heart ailment (although medical testimony
established the existence of a pre-existing heart condition) assisted in
the shoeing of a reluctant mule and died that evening of heart failure.'6
In Aden Mining Co. v. Hall,16 where decedent was injured by a slate
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
struction of statutes in derogation of the common law shall not apply toS this chapter.
10 84 Ky. 9,12, 14 S.W.2d 741, 742 (1940).
11tSee Note, 49 Ky. L.J. 394, 400 (1961) and cases cited therein. The
author of the note questions the appropriateness of the distinction.
12Terry v. Associated Stone Co., 834 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Ky. 1960). The
injury in this case occurred in 1955, before the effective date of the amendment
to KRS 842.005(1) and was the first case in this jurisdiction to award com-
pensation for a disabling heart attack resulting from a pre-existing heart disease
which bad possibly been superinduced by strain.
(91 3 Frye's Guardian v. Gamble Bros., 188 Ky. 283, 288, 221 S.W. 870, 872
(120), wherein the court stated:
It may be proper, in giving a construction to a statute, to look to
the effects and consequences, when its provisions are ambiguous, or the
legislative intention is doubtful. But, when the law is clear and explicit,
and its provisions are susceptible of but one interpretation, its con-
sequences, if evil, can only be avoided by a change of the law itself, to
be effected by legislative and not judicial action.
14 Rusch v. Louisville Water Co., 193 Ky. 698, 237 S.W. 889 (1922).
15 Wallins Creek Collieries Co. v. Williams, 211 Ky. 200, 277 S.W. 284
(1925).
16252 Ky. 168, 66 S.W.2d 41 (1988).
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fall and after returning to work suffered a strain from lifting a timber
and subsequently died of a heart ailment, the court said, in the absence
of any record of a previous heart ailment:
The Board is unable to find, without speculation or conjecture, that
the decedent died as a direct or natural result of a traumatic injury
by accident, but is of the opinion that the death was the result of a
pre-existing disease, which disease was not the natural or direct
result of a traumatic injury by accident.17
These cases illustrate the Kentucky law prior to the Adams case,
i.e., where there is a pre-existing heart condition which is manifested
during the usual course of employment, there is not a traumatic per-
sonal injury. Apparently the court felt this was bad law and disre-
garded the efforts of the legislature by referring to traumatic as a
"slippery word"'8 and making no pretense of any attempt to define or
apply it.
When there is a pre-existing heart condition, and the employee is
stricken while performing the routine duties of his employment, should
the injury be compensable?19 The writer would answer this question
in the negative. Cardiovascular diseases account for over half of all
deaths in the United States, and these deaths occur during inactivity
as often as during periods of physical exertion.20 There is a great deal
of controversy among the medical authorities as to the causes of heart
failure.
2 1
If these injuries are recognized as compensable, the courts will
establish a radical inconsistency among claimants in Kentucky. If an
employee suffering from an unknown heart condition is stricken away
from the job, he will be denied compensation. Such manifestation
could occur during sleep or during a period of extreme exertion, and
regardless of what caused the manifestation it is almost certain that
he would be denied compensation. However, place the same employee
on the job and allow the manifestation to occurl Based on the decision
in the principal case the injury would be compensable. The employee
in the last mentioned hypothetical situation would be compensated
because he was fortunate enough to be at work when the attack
occurred.
17Id. at 171, 66 S.W.2d at 43.
18 Grimes v. Goodlett & Adams, 345 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Ky. 1960).
19 See Note, 49 Ky. L.J. 394, 395 (1961). The author answers this question
in the affirmative and suggests that the court should ignore the 1956 amendment:
[In spite of or notwithstanding the addition of the word 'traumatic'
to the statute, the Workmen's Cornpensaion Board and the Kentucky
Court of Appeals should not retreat from this forward-looking position.
201d. at 396.21 Kissan, Injury and Heart Disease-Legal Aspects, 15 Ohio St. L.J. 409
(1954).
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The effect of the present decision is to make the employer an
insurer of any employee suffering from an unknown heart condition,
while on the job. This could be a liberal step toward the realization
of the court's statement in a 1939 decision:
If the plaintiffs illness is compenable here, then in a factory where
a window or door is opened for ventiliation, and one workman out of
100 catches a cold in his head and chest and six months thereafter
develops tuberculosis, such workman would be entitled to compensa-
tion, because it is common knowledge that such a cold fertilizes the
ground for tubercle-bacii. 22
Regardless of the merits of the claim, the court in the principal
case was bound to construe the statute "with a view to promote their
objects and carry out the intent of the legislature."23 The court failed
to do this by refusing to recognize the intent of the 1956 amendment.
Lowell T. Hughes
22 American Rolling Mill Co. v. Pack, 278 Ky. 175, 182-88, 128 S.W.2d
187, 191 (1989).
23 KRS 446.080(1).
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